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TOWARD A THEORY OF STRUCTURE: 
DUALITY, AGENCY, AND TRANSFORMATION 
"Structure" is one of the most important and most elusive terms in the vocabulary of 
contemporary social science. The concept is central not only in such eponymous schools as  
stuctural functionalism, structuralism, and post-structuralism, but in virtually all tendencies of 
social-scientific thought. I t  is no accident that the term structure figures in the titles of some of 
the most influential books in the social sciences of the past half century -- for example a 
Structure of Social Action (Parsons, 193 7), S ~' (Merton, 1949), or 
The Structure of Scientific R e v o l w  (Kuhn, 1962). My own experience convinces me that the 
term structure is of fundamental strategic importance in contemporary social scientific writing and 
conversation. We -- myself as  much as  others -- invoke structure constantly in our discourse, 
especially when we find ourselves in tight conceptual spots. 
Yet if social scientists find it impossible to do without the term structure, we also find i t  
nearly impossible to adequately define it. Many of us have surely had the experience of being 
asked by a "naive" student what we mean by structure, and then finding it embarrassingly to 
define it non-tautologically -- without using the term structure or one of its variants in its own 
definition. Sometimes we may find what seems an acceptable synonym -- for example, "pattern" - 
- but all such synonyms lack their original's rhetorical force. When it comes to indicating that a 
relation is powerful or important it is certainly far more convincing to designate it as "structural" 
than as'"patterning." The term structure empowers what it designates. "Structure" in its 
nominative sense always implies structure in its transitive verbal sense. Whatever aspect of 
social life we designate as  structure is posited as  "structuring" some other aspect of social 
existence -- whether it is class that structures politics, gender that structures employment 
opportunities, rhetorical conventions that structure texts or utterances, or modes of production 
that structure social formations. "Structure" functions in social scientific discourse as  a powerful 
metonymic device, identifying some part of a complex social reality as typifying or explaining the 
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whole. Structure, in short, is a word to conjure with in the social sciences. I t  has a persuasive 
power that escapes attempts at definition, a power we all feel but find virtually impossible to 
reduce to words. "Structure," in fact, is less a precise concept than a kind of founding or epistemic 
metaphor of social scientific -- and scientific -- discourse. 1 
I have no ambition to reduce "structure" to some simple and crystaline definition. An 
epistemic metaphor so pervasive and evasive cannot successfully be hogtied and hobbled by 
smallminded social theorists; for the forseeable future, "structure" is bound to escape any attempt 
a t  formal definition and continue its essential if somewhat mysterious work in the constitution of 
social scientific knowledge. There are, however, some dangers in current usage of the term that 
make self-conscious theorizing about the meanings of "structure" seem worthwhile. The chief 
problem is that "structural" or "structuralist" arguments tend to assume a far too rigid causal 
determinism in social life. Those features of social existence denominated as  "structures" tend to 
be reified and treated as  primary, hard, and immutable, like the girders of a building, while the 
events or social processes they "structure" tend to be seen as  secondary and superficial, like the 
outer "skin" of a skyscraper, or a s  mutable within "hard" structural constraints, like the layout of 
offices on floors defined by a skeleton of girders. What tends to get lost in the language of 
structure is the efficacy of human action -- or "agency;" to use the currently favored term. 
"Structures" tend to appear in social scientific discourse as  totally impervious to human agency, to 
exist apart from, but nevertheless to determine the essential shape of, the strivings and motivated 
transactions that constitute the experienced surface of social life. A social science trapped in an 
unexamined metaphor of structure tends ineluctably to reduce persons to cleverly programmed 
automatons and tends to make structural transformations appear as  mysterious events occurring 
offstage, outside the realm of human action. I therefore believe that a reconceptualization of the 
notion of structure is necessary to retain -- or regain -- both the realism and the moral relevance 
of social science. 
This article will attempt to develop a theory of structure that overcomes the two cardinal 
weaknesses of the concept a s  it is normally employed in social science, (1) restoring human agency 
to social actors and (2) thereby making it possible to account for transformations of structures. 
My strategy will be to begin from what I regard a s  the most promising existing formulations -- 
Anthony Giddens' notion of "the duality of structure" and, a t  a later point in the argument, Pierre 
Bourdieu's concept of the "habitus" -- and to develop a more adequate theory by means of 
critique, reformulation, and elaboration. I should made it clear that by "theory" I mean more or 
less what Giddens (1984, pp. xvii-xx) does: not a deductively related and empirically testable set 
of explanatory propositions about the world, but a conceptual framework and analytical 
vocabulary in terms of which propositions about the world might be formulated. Although the 
argument of this article is necessarily abstract, it is developed with the criterion of practical utility 
in mind. Indeed, it might be characterized as  a theoretical reflection on empirical studies of social 
change carried out in the past both by myself (e.g:Sewell, 1980, 1988) and by other historically 
minded social scientists. 
THE DUALITY OF STRUCTURE: A CRITIQUE AND REFORMULATION OF GIDDENS' 
THEORY 
The most serious effort a t  reconceptualization of structure in recent social theory has been 
made by Anthony Giddens, who has been insisting since the mid-1970s that structures must be 
regarded as  "dual" (Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1981, 1984). Giddens' notion of the "duality of 
structure" is not altogether novel. Among other things, it is a kind of explicit codification of 
Marx's famous aphorism in The Ei-th Brumaire of Louis Bonal>arte: "Men make their own 
history, but they do not make it just as  they please; they do not make it under circumstances 
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted by history" 
(Marx, n.d., p. 13). But in Marx this was just a brilliant rhetorical aside. Giddens, by contrast, 
has attempted to make the duality of structure the keystone of a general theory of social life. I 
regard his conceptualization of structure a s  the obiligatory starting point of any serious attempt to 
rethink the concept of strucutre. 
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What does Giddens mean when he calls structures "dual?" They are dual, he says, in the 
sense that they are "both the medium and the outcome of the practices which constitute social 
systems" (Giddens, 1981, p. 27). Structures shape people's practices, but it is also people's 
practices that constitute (and reproduce) structures. In this view of things, human agency and 
structure, far from being &, in fact ~ r e s u ~ ~ o s e  each other. Without the practices that enact 
them, structures could not exist. And without structures to give content and direction to practice, 
human agency would be merely random fluctuations of will. Structures are enacted by what 
Giddens calls "knowledgeable" human agents (that is, people who know what they are doing and 
how to do it), and agents act by putting into practice their necessarily structured knowledge. 
Hence, "structures must not be conceptualized as simply placing constraints on human agency, 
but a s  enabling" (Giddens, 1976, p. 161). This conception of human agents a s  "knowledgeable" 
and "enabled" implies that they are capable of puting their structurally formed capacities to work 
in creative or innovative ways. And if enough people or powerful enough people act in innovative 
ways, their action may have the consequence of transforming the very structures that gave them 
the capacity to act. Dual structures, consequently, are also -- by definition -- mutable structures. 
Duality of Structure and Social History 
As a theoretically self-conscious social historian, I find Giddens' notion of structure 
particularly congenial. When my generation of "new social historians" turned to sociology and 
anthropology for inspiration in the 1960s and 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  we did so largely because we sensed that 
these disciplines, with their central concepts of "social structure" and "culture," could help us to 
overcome the massive volontaristic bias inscribed in traditional historical writing. Time has 
proved us right in this supposition. Deploying structural notions derived from sociology and 
anthropology, social historians have effected a major revolution in historical scholarship. The rise 
of social history to dominance in the historical profession meant not just a displacement of politics 
as  the major subject matter of history, but also a much more fundamental redefinition of history's 
epistemic object from the deeds of great men to the collective transformation of social and cultural 
structures. 
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But however useful, the concepts of structure borrowed from sociology and anthropology 
proved somewhat ungainly when applied to problems of social history. This was, in part, because 
most historians -- and quite properly, in my opinion -- remained wedded to a t  least a restrained 
version of voluntarism. The sociologists' concept of social structure, whether of a structural- 
functionalist or a Marxist variety, could help a historian to define the nature of the institutional 
patterns or class relations whose transformation she wished to analyse, but they also seemed to 
imply the production of actors whose motives and behavior were so determined by the structures 
that they could hardly be expected to engage in transformative acts. The anthropological concept 
of culture was -- if anything -- even more inimical to any notion of transformative action. 
Developed to display and to validate as fully human the coherence of radically exotic ways of life, 
the concept of culture implied that persons formed under a culture's influence would be 
programmed to reproduce that culture, with even their moments of liminality or their ritual 
rebellions ultimately serving to reinforce the system in place (Turner, 1969; Gluckman, 1954). 
I t  is probably fair to say that most historians have not been terribly bothered by the 
logical problems involved in applying sociological and anthropological concepts of structure to 
questions of historical change. They have generally been content to narrate their way out of 
trouble by showing how real persons and groups, shaped and limited by the social and cultural 
structures of their particular time and place, actually acted in such a way that the shaping and 
limiting structures were changed by their action. Although probably writing more from 
professional instinct than from considered theoretical scruples, the historians have, in my opinion, 
made the theoretically correct move. In applying sociological and anthropological notions of 
structure, social historians have demonstrated how, in a great variety of times and places, 
structures are in fact dual: how historical agents' thoughts, motives, and intentions are constituted 
by the cultures and social institutions into which they are born; how these cultures and institutions 
are reproduced by the structurally shaped and constrained actions of those agents; but also how, 
in certain circumstances, the agents can (or are forced to) improvise or innovate in structurally 
shaped ways that ~ i ~ c a n t l y  reconfigure the very structures that constituted them. Giddens has 
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arrived a t  his position by way of a theoretical critique intended to reconcile phenomenology, 
interactionism, and ethnomethodology with Marx, Durkheim, and Weber; he has showed no great 
interest in the work of social historians. Yet I believe that Giddens' notion of the duality of 
structure underwrites theoretically what social historians (and in recent years many historical 
sociologists and historical anthropologists as well) do in practice. 
What Is Structure? 
Giddens calls his efforts "the theory of structuration," but "structure" -- the central term 
of his theory -- remains frustratingly underspecified in his work. Unlike most social scientists, he 
does not leave the term completely undefined and simply allow it to do its accustomed magical 
work in his readers' minds. Especially in Central Problems in Social Theorv (1979), he discusses 
"structure" a t  some length. But I do not think that the concept of structure he elaborates there or 
elsewhere is sufficiently clear or robust to serve as the foundation of a theoretical system. 
Giddens defines structure formally in several places, including in the glossary to Thg 
. . 
Constltutlon of Societs 
S t ruc tm.  Rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social 
systems. Structure exists only a s  memory traces, the organic basis of human 
knowledgeability, and as  instantiated in action (1984, p. 377). 
This far from crystaline definition requires some exegesis. The terms "rules and resources," in 
spite of their deceptive simplicity, are actually quite obscure and doubtful, and will have to be 
discussed a t  length. Let us therefore begin with the rest of the definition, which is arcanely 
worded but relatively straight-forward in meaning. By "social systems" Giddens means more or 
less what most social scientists mean by "societies": empirically observable intertwining social 
practices that link persons to one another across time and space. Social systems, according to 
Giddens, have no existence apart from the practices that constitute them and these practices are 
reproduced by the "recursive" (that is, repeated) enactments of structures. Structures, for 
Giddens, are not the patterned social practices that make up social systems, but the DrinciDles 
that pattern these practices. Structures, therefore, have only what he elsewhere terms a 
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"virtual" existence (e.g. 1984, p. 17). Structures do not exist concretely in time and space except 
a s  "memory traces, the organic basis of knowledgeability" (in other words, only as  ideas or 
schemas lodged in human brains), and as they are "instantiated in action" (in other words, put 
into practice). 
Structures as Rules 
Structures, then, are "virtual" and are put into practice in the production and reproduction 
of social life. But of what do these structures consist? According to Giddens' definition, they 
consist of "rules and resources." Giddens' notion of rules is largely derived from French 
structuralism. This is especially clear in New Rules of Sociological Method and W r a l  Problems 
of Social Theorv, where he relies heavily on a typically structuralist analogy with Saussurian 
linguistics. Giddens' likens his distinction between structure and practice (or between structure 
and system, which is of course an intertwined set of practices) to the Saussurian distinction 
'between a and parole (or between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimensions of 
language). According to this analogy, structure is to practice a s  (the abstract rules that 
make possible the production of grammatical sentences) is to parole (speech, or the production of 
actual sentences) (1976, p.118-22). Hence structure, like lanpue, is a complex of rules with a 
"virtual" existence, while practice, like speech, is an enactment of these rules in space and time. 
For a French structuralist, structure is the complex of such rules. For Levi-Strauss, for example, 
structure refers to the set of rules that enables binary oppositions to be ordered into myths (Levi- 
Strauss, 1963). In Central P r o b l e m s i n S o c i a l o r v ,  Giddens affirms the similarity of his 
concept of structure to that of Levi-Strauss (1979, pp.62-4). But he also attempts to distinguish 
himself from the French structuralists, in part by insisting that because structures "bind" time 
and space, they must be conceptualized as including not only rules but w u r c e  as  well (1979, 
pp. 63-4). However, Giddens leaves his discussion of rules dangling. We know that he regards his 
concept of the rules that make up structures a s  similar to Levi-Strauss' concept, but also that it he 
regards it as  differing in certain respects. But precisely how is it similar and how different? 
Unlike Levi-Strauss, Giddens fails to specify in any positive sense what structural rules are or 
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how they might be identified. Nor does he give examples of rules that underlie any actual social 
practices. All we know from -a1 Pr&&.ms in Social Theorv is that rules are virtual and that 
they somehow generate social practice and social systems. 
In The of Soc . . ie& which is the most recent general statement of his theory, 
Giddens retreats even farther from a specifically Levi-Straussian conception of rules. There he 
defines rules simply but, in my opinion, rather promisingly: "Let us regard the rules of social 
life ... as generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social life" (1984, p. 21). 
This definition of rules as  generalizable procedures could of course include "deep structural" Levi- 
Straussian "transformation rules," but it also implies the possibility of rules of a wide range of 
types. Giddens, however, does not give examples or elaborate typologies of the sorts of 
generalizable procedures he has in mind. Consequently, his conception of rules is if anything more 
. . f Socie& impoverished in The Constitution o than it was in Central Problems in Social Theorv, 
which a t  least implied a strong analogy with Levi-Strauss. However, I think his definition of rules 
as generalizable procedures can be used as  a foundation for elaborating a more robust conception. 
Throughout his theory, Giddens places a great deal of weight on the notion that actors are 
-. I t  is, presumably, the knowledge of rules that makes people capable of action. 
But Giddens develops no vocabulary for specifying the c m  of what people know. I would 
argue that such a vocabulary is in fact readily available, but is best developed in a field Giddens 
has to date almost entirely ignored: cultural anthropology. After all, the usual social-scientific 
term for "what people know" is culture, and those who have most fruitfully theorized and studied 
culture are the anthropologists. Levi-Strauss, the one anthropologist Giddens has taken seriously, 
is very much the odd man out in anthropology. He is virtually unique in his fixation on very deep 
or general structures. His attempt, ultimately, is to reach by successive abstrations the structure 
of the human brain itself. Even some of the structuralist anthropologists who have been most 
profoundly influenced by Levi-Strauss (see, for example, Sahlins, 1976, 1981, 1984) have been far 
more interested in applying Levi-Strauss's method of seeking out recurrent patterns of binary 
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oppositions in order to specify the assumptions, practices and beliefs of particular peoples than in 
tracing such oppositions back to the structure of "the savage mind" or the human brain. 
Rather than staying a t  the "deep structural" level preferred by Levi-Strauss, I think we 
should, like most anthropologists, think of rules a s  existing a t  various levels of depth. Rules 
nearer the surface may by definition be more "superficial," but they are not necessarily less 
important than the deepest structures in their implications for social life. "The rules of social life" 
should be thought of a s  including all the varieties of cultural schemas, a t  all levels of generality or 
depth, that anthropologists have uncovered in their research: not only the array of binary 
oppositions that make up a given society's fundamental tools of thought, but also the various 
conventions, recipies, scenarios, principles of action, and habits of speech and gesture built up with 
these fundamental tools.3 
These various schemas are, to quote Giddens, "generalizeable procedures applied in the 
enactmentJreproduction of social life." They are "generalizeable" in the sense that they can be 
applied in or extended to a variety of contexts of interaction. Such rules, schemas, or procedures - 
- whether rules of ettiquette, or aesthetic norms, or such recipes for group action a s  the royal 
progress, grain riot, or democratic vote, or a set of equivalences between wet and dry, female and 
male, nature and culture, private and public, or the body as  a metaphor for hierarchy, or the 
notion that the human being is composed of a body and a soul -- can be used not only in the 
situation in which they are first learned or most conventionally applied. They can be generalized - 
- that is transposed or extended -- to new situations when the opportunity arises. This 
gmeralizeabilitv or $ran- of rules is, of course, the reason that rules must be understood 
a s  virtual. To say that rules are virtual is to say that they cannot be reduced to their existence in 
any particular practice or any particular location in space-time: they can be actualized in a 
potentially broad and unpredetermined range of situations. 
I agree with Giddens, then, that the rules constituting structures may usefully be 
conceptualized as having a "virtual" existence, that they consist of internalized procedures or 
schemas capable of being actualized or put into practice in a range of different circumstances. 
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Such rules should be thought of a s  operating a t  widely varying levels of depth or generality, from 
Levi-Straussian "deep stuctures" to relatively superficial rules of ettiquette. 
Structures as Resources 
Surely part of Giddens' nervousness about wholeheartedly embracing Levi-Strauss' 
conception of structure is that he wishes to distance himself from Levi-Strauss' sublime 
indifference to questions of power, domination, and social change -- indeed, to questions of social 
practice more generally. Presumably it is largely for this reason that Giddens insists that 
structures are not merely &, but rules d resources, or "rule-resourse sets" (1984, p. 377). 
But Giddens' concept of resources is even less adequately theorized than his concept of rules. I 
agree with Giddens that any notion of structure that ignores asymmetries of power is radically 
incomplete. But simply tacking an undertheorized notion of resources onto an essentially rule- 
based notion of structure succeeds merely in confusing things. 
In Cent . ral Problems in Soc~al Theorv, Giddens defines resources as  "the media whereby 
transformative capacity is employed as  power in the routine course of social interaction" (1979, p. 
92). Unless I am missing some subtlety, this obscurely worded definition could be rendered into 
ordinary English a s  follows: "Resources are anything that can serve as  a source of power in social 
interactions." This seems to me an unexceptional statement of what we usually mean by social 
resources, but not very theoretically informative. Besides this anodyne definition, about all he 
tells us about resources is that they can be classified into two types, "authoritative and 
"allocative." In Central Problems in Social Theory, he defines "authorization" a s  "capabilities 
which generate command over persons" and "allocation" as "capabilities which generate command 
over oblects or other material phenomena" (1979, p. 100). By extension, authoritative resources 
should be human resources and allocative resources non-human resources -- which once again 
seems unexceptional. 
In The Comtitut~on a o c  . . i e t .  however, Giddens shifts the definition subtly so that 
allocative resources are defined a s  "material" and authoritative resources as  "non-material." The 
. . 
glossary of The Constitution of Societv defines "allocative resources as  "material resources 
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involved in the generation of power, including the natural 'environment and physical artifacts; 
allocative resources derive from human dominion over nature" (1984, p. 373). Authoritative 
resources are defrned as "non-material resources involved in the generation of power, deriving 
from the capablitiy of harnessing the activities of human beings; authoritative resources result 
from the dominion of some actors over others" (1984, p. 373). I would maintain that the 
materiaynon-material distinction does not actually catch Giddens' own meaning nearly as well as  
the humaninon-human distinction. Humans, after all, are no less material than coal or railway 
cars; they are different because they also have minds. Because the physical utility of the peculiar 
category of material objects known as  b m o  s& depends on what is in their minds, it makes 
sense to distinguish human from non-human resources. Humans can be made to move or act far 
more efficiently and effectively by cognitive and emotional appeals than by purely physical means. 
95 - 
Because it is impossible to convince coal to move from the.ground to a coal c v  but it is possible to 
k., 
convince a human to remove coal from the ground and put it in a coal car, the nature and 
dynamics of human resources are fundamentally different from those of non-human resources. 
\ 
Because both humans and other naturally occuring or manufactured objects are material, a 
distinction between "material" and "non-material" resources actually blurs rather than clarifing 
this important di~t inct ion.~ 
I believe that Giddens' classification of resources is potentially useful, but that it needs to 
be reformulated and put into ordinary English as  follows. Resources are of two types, human and 
non-human. Non-human resources are objects, animate or inanimate, naturally occuring or 
manufactured, that can be used to enhance or maintain power; human resources are physical 
strength, dexterity, knowledge, and emotional c o d t m e n t s  that can be used to enhance or 
maintain power, including knowledge of the means of gaining, retaining, controlling, and 
propagating either human or non-human resources. Both types of resources are media of power, 
and as such are unevenly distributed. But however unequally resources may be distributed, some 
measure of both human and nonhuman resources are controlled by all members of society, no 
matter how destitute and oppressed. Indeed, part of what it means to conceive of human beings 
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as  agents is to conceive of them as  rn- by the possession of resources of one kind or 
another. 
Structures as Rules and Resources 
Reformulating Giddens' concept of resources does not make it clear how resources and 
rules combine to form structures. Here the most glaring problem is Giddens' definition of 
structures as  "virtual." As we have seen, this makes perfect sense for structures conceptualized 
as rules. But are resources also virtual? Surprisingly, Giddens does not seem to have considered 
the point. The notion of a virtual resource seems particularly doubtful in the case of non-human 
(or in Giddens' terms "allocative") resources. Non-human resources would surely include such 
things a s  factories owned by capitalists, stocks of weapons controlled by Kings or generals, land 
rented by peasants, or stacks of Hudsons' Bay blankets accumulated by Kwakiutl chiefs. It is 
clear that factories, armaments, land, and Hudsons' Bay blankets have had a crucial weight in 
shaping and constraining social life in particular times and places, and it therefore seems sensible 
to include them in some way in our concept of structure. But it is also hard to see how such 
material resources can be considered as  "virtual," since material things by definition exist in space 
and time. It is, moreover, only in particular times, places, and quantities that such material 
objects can serve a s  resources. 
The case of human resources is only a little less clear. By definition, human bodies, like 
any other material objects, cannot be virtual. But what about knowledge and emotional 
committments, the non-material aspects of human resources? Examples of non-material human 
resources might be the priest's power to consecrate the host and hear confession, ordinary citizens' 
ability to read and write, childrens' sense of obligation toward their mothers, or the fear and 
reverence that subjects feel for their King. Unlike factories or Hudsons' Bay blankets, such 
resources are not material, or a t  least not in the same sense. Nevertheless they seem to me 
actual a s  opposed to virtual. They exist in what Giddens calls "time-space;" they are observable 
and measurable characteristics of real people who live in particular times and congregate in 
particular places. And it is their actualization in the minds and bodies of real people that make 
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them resources. I t  is not the disembodied concept of the majesty of the king that gives him power, 
but the fear and reverence felt for him by his actual subjects. 
If I am right that all resources are actual rather than virtual, Giddens' notion of structure 
turns out to be self-contradictory. If structures are virtual, they cannot include both rules and 
resources. And if they include both rules and resources, they cannot be virtual. He, and we, can't 
have it both ways. But which way should we have it? The simplest and clearest way of 
conceptualizing structure would be to return to Giddens' starting point in structuralism, and to 
assert that structure refers only to rules, not to resources, and that resources should be thought of 
as  an effect of structures, rather than as a co-equal element in the definition of structures. In this 
way, structures would retain their virtual quality, and concrete distributions of resources would be 
seen not as  structures but as  media animated and shaped by structures, that is, by rules. 
It is not unreasonable to claim that human resources are the products of rules. A given 
number of soldiers will generate different amounts and kinds of military power depending on the 
contemporary rules of warfare (such a s  chivalric codes), the notions of strategy and tactics 
available to the generals, and the regimes of training to which the troops have been subjected. 
The priest's power to consecrate the host derives from rules operating a t  two rather different 
levels. First, a priest's training has given him mastery of a wide range of explicit and implicit 
techniques of knowledge and self control that enable him to perform satisfactorily as  a priest. And 
second, he has been raised to the dignity of the priesthood by an ordination ceremony that, 
through the laying on of hands by a bishop, has mobilized the power of apostolic succession and 
thereby made him capable of an apparently miraculous feat -- transforming bread and wine into 
the body and blood of Christ. Fear and reverence for kings are manifestations of fundamental 
notions about the cosmic function of kingship, notions that are woven into a multitude of 
discourses and ceremonies a t  all levels of society; similarly, obligations felt by children toward 
their mothers are based in notions of the bonds of nature, of nuturance, and of obedience that are 
encoded both in multiple routines of family life and in sermons, adages, novels, and works of 
political theory. And the powers of the literate citizen are actually the direct consequence of their 
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ability to encode in print and decode from print the rules of grammar, syntax, and rhetoric. 
Human resources, these examples suggest, may be thought of as  manifestations and consequences 
of the enactment of rules. 
But while we might reasonably speak of human resources as  rule-generated, it is harder to 
see how non-human resources could be conceived of as  generated by rules. Factories, land, and 
Hudsons' Bay blankets have material qualities that are certainly not generated by rules. But it is 
also true that their condition as  resources capable of producing and reproducing disparities in 
social power is not wholly intrinsic in their material existence. What they amount to as resources 
is in fact a consequence of the rules that govern their use. To take perhaps the most obvious case, 
an immense stack of Hudsons' Bay blankets would be nothing more than a means of keeping a 
large number of people warm if it were not for the cultural rules that constituted the Kwakiutl 
potlatch; but given these rules, the blankets, given away in a potlatch, became a means of 
demonstrating the power of the chief, and consequently of acquiring prestige, marriage alliances, 
military power, and labor services (Sahlins??, Boaz, 1966). In this case, it is clearly the rules 
constituting the potlatch that determine the value, extent, and effects of Hudsons' Bay blankets a s  
a resource. But I would argue that this is true of non-human resources in general. For example, 
the extent and kinds of resources generated by a factory will depend on whether it is owned by an 
individual capitalist or by a workers' cooperative -- in other words on rules defining the nature of 
property rights and of work-place authority. The resources gained by peasants from the land they 
use will be determined by the rules of land tenure, the exigencies of customary law, the sets of 
obligations owed to kinsmen, and the known agricultural techniques. Examples could be multiplied 
a t  will. Non-human resources have a material existence that is not reducible to rules, but the 
activation of material things a s  resources, the determination of their value and social power, is 
dependent on the rules of social conduct that govern their use. 
It is clear, then, that resources can plausibly be thought of as  effects of rules. It therefore 
would certainly be possible to clean up Giddens' concept of structure by defining structure a s  rules 
with a purely virtual existence and resources not as co-equal elements in structure but as  media 
and outcomes of the operation of structure. But notice that if we adopt this definition, the 
rhetorical power of the term structure insinuates a single direction of causality. That which is 
termed structure is, by this act of denomination, granted power over that which is not structure. 
Stocks of material goods and peoples' knowledge and emotional commitments become inert, mere 
media for and outcomes of the determinative operations of rules. If we insist that structures are 
virtual, we risk lapsing into the de facto idealism that continually haunts structuralism however 
much its exponents -- for example, Levi-Strauss (1966, p. 130) -- protest their materialist 
credentials and intentions. Rules -- mental structures -- become the only form-giving entity, and 
agents become agents of these mental structures, actors who can only recite pre-existing scripts. 
To define structures in this way threatens, in short, to deny their duality, and consequently to 
annihilate the central premise of Giddens' theory. 
The Duality of Rules and Resources 
If the duality of structure is to be saved -- and a s  far a s  I am concerned the notion of 
duality of structure is the main attraction of Giddens' theory in the first place -- we must take the 
other alternative and conceive of structures as  having (appropriately) a character. Structure, 
then, should be defined a s  composed simultane~usly of rules, which are virtual, and of resources, 
which are actual. 
If structures are dual in this sense, then it must be true that rules are the effects of 
resources a s  much a s  resources are the effects of rules. This seems to me a perfectly reasonaljle 
claim, one whose plausibility can be demonstrated by considering a few examples. A factory is 
not an inert pile of bricks, wood, and metal. I t  incorporates or actualizes rules, and this means 
that the rules can be inferred from the material form of the factory. The factory gate, the 
punching-in station, the design of the assembly line: all of these features of the factory teach and 
validate the rules of the capitalist labor contract. Or take the plfiest's performance of the mass. 
When the priest transforms the host and wine into the body and blood of Christ and administers 
the host to communicants, the communicants are suffused by a sense of spiritual well-being. 
Communion therefore demonstrates to the communicants the reality and the power of the rule of 
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apostolic succession which made the priest a priest. In short, if resources are instantiations or 
embodiments of rules, they therefore teach and justify the rules as well. Resources, we might say, 
are & like texts, to recover the rules they instantiate. 
Rules, then, are effects of resources as much as  resources are effects of rules. If rules are 
to be sustained or reproduced over time -- and without sustained reproduction they could hardly be 
counted as  structural -- they must be validated by the accumulation of resources that their 
enactment engenders. Rules not empowered or regenerated by resources would soon be 
abandonned and forgotten, just a s  resources without rules to direct their use would soon dissipate 
and decay. Sets of rules and resources may properly be said to constitute &ructures only when 
they mutually imply and sustain each other over time. 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF DUAL STRUCTURES: OUT OF BOURDIEU'S HABITUS 
A definition of structure as made up of both rules and resources avoids both the material 
determinism of traditional Marxism and the ideal determinism of traditional French structuralism. 
But how it can enhance our ability to understand transformations of structures is not immediately 
apparent. Indeed, one could argue that if the enactment of rules always creates resources that 
teach and validate the rules, rules and resources should simply reproduce each other without 
change indefinitely. The claim that dual structures engender stasis is far from fanciful; such an 
argument has in fact been made with great panache in Pierre Bourdieu's brilliant and widely 
influential Outline of a Theorv of Practice (1977). Any attempt to argue that duality of structure 
improves our ability to understand social transformations must confront Bourdieu head on. 
Duality and Stasis 
Although he uses' a different terminology, Bourdieu has powerfully illustrated the mutually 
sustaining relationship between rules and resources (what he calls "mental structures" and "the 
world of objects"). For example, his well-known discussion of the Kabyle house shows how the 
design of the house and the placement of objects in it reproduces fundamental Kabyle cultural 
oppositions, such as between high and low, male and female, fire and water, and light and dark, 
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and thereby patterns all activities conducted in the house in terms of such oppositions. Bourdieu 
remarks that 
all the actions performed in a space constructed in this way are immediately quaiifled 
symbolically and function a s  so many structural exercises through which is built up 
practical mastery of the fundamental schemes ...( Bourdieu, 1977, p.91). 
The house is given its shape by the application of rules ("mental structures" in Bourdieu's 
vocabulary), and the house in turn inculcates these rules by assigning tasks, objects, persons and 
emotional dispositions to differently coded spaces. As Bourdieu puts it, in his characteristically 
ornate and paradoxical style, 
... The mental structures which construct the world of objects are constructed in the 
practice of a world of objects constructed according to the same structures. The mind born 
of the world of objects does not rise as  a subjectivity confronting an objectivity: the 
objective universe is made up of objects which are the product of objectifying operations 
structured according to the very structures which the mind-applies to it. The mind is a 
metaphor of the world of objects which is itself but an endless circle of mutually reflecting 
metaphors (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 9 1). 
Tn many respects, Bourdieu's "theory of practice" is fully compatible with the conception of 
the duality of structure for which I am arguing in this paper. Bourdieu recognizes the mutual 
reproduction of rules and resources that constitutes temporally durable structures -- what he calls 
the "habitus." His discussion of the habitus powerfully elaborates the means by which mutually 
reinforcing rule-resource sets constitute human subjects with particular sorts of knowledge and 
dispositions. Moreover, Bourdieu's Kabyle subjects are not cultural dopes. They are endowed 
with the capacity to engage in highly autonomous, discerning, and strategic actions. (See, for 
example, Bourdieu's discussion of gift exchange, pp. 4-10, and matrimonial strategies, pp.32-53.) 
Bourdieu's Kabyles would seem to be exactly the sort of knowledgeable actors called for by 
Giddens' theory. 
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Yet Bourdieu's habitus retains precisely the agent-proof quality that the concept of the 
duality of structure is supposed to be capable of overcoming. In Bourdieu's habitus, rules and 
resources so powerfully reproduce one another that even the most cunning or improvisational 
actions undertaken by agents necessarily reproduce the structure. 
As an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular 
conditions in which it is constituted, the habitus engenders all the thoughts, all the 
perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions, and no others (1966, p. 
95). 
Although he avoids either a traditional French structuralist ideal determinism or a traditional 
Marxist material determinism, he does so only by erecting a combined determinism that makes 
significant social transformations seem impossible. 
But is this powerful implication of stasis really warranted? After all, the Kabyle society in 
which Bourdieu carried out his field work produced a momentous anti-colonial revolution shortly 
after Bourdieu returned to France to analyze his data. It seems to me that, in spite of his 
devastating attacks on Cartesian and Levi-Straussian "objectivism" (1977, esp. pp. 1-30), 
Bourdieu's own theory has fallen victim to an impossibly objectified and over-totalized conception 
of society. Only in the idealized world constructed by the social scientific observer could the 
habitus engender "all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions" consistent with 
existing social conditions "and no others." In the real world of human struggles and strategems, 
plenty of thoughts, perceptions, and actions consistent with the reproduction of existing social 
patterns fail to occur and inconsistent ones occur all the time. 
Why Structural  Change Is Possible 
It is, of course, entirely proper for Bourdieu to insist on the strong reproductive bias built 
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into structures -- that is the whole point of the structure concept and part of what makes the 
concept so essential for theorizing social change. After all, as  Renato Rosaldo (1980) and M a r s h d  
Shalins (1981, 1985) have brilliantly demonstrated, the same reproductive biases of structures 
that explain the powerful continuities of social relations also make it possible to explain the paths 
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followed in episodes of social change. What gets Bourdieu off the track is his unrealistically 
unified and totalized concept of the habitus, which he conceptualizes as a vast series of strictly 
homologous structures encompassing all of social experience. Such a conceptualization, which 
Bourdieu in fact shares roughly with many structurally inclined theorists, cannot explain change 
a s  arising from within the operation of structures. It is characteristic that many structural 
accounts of social transformation tend to introduce change from outside the system and then trace 
out the ensuing structurally shaped changes, rather than showing how change is generated by the 
operation of structures internal to a society. In this respect, Marshall Sahlins' (1981) analysis of 
the effect of Captain Cook's voyages on the Hawaiians is emblematic. I t  is my conviction that a 
theory of change cannot be built into a theory of structure unless we adopt a far more multiple, 
contingent, and fractured conception of society -- and of structure -- than Bourdieu's. What is 
needed is a conceptual vocabulary that makes it possible to show how the ordinary operations of 
structures can generate transformations. To this end, I propose five key axioms: the multiplicity 
of structures, the transposability of rules, the unpredictability of resource accumulation, the 
polysemy of resources, and the intersection of structures. 
The m&iplicitv of structures. Societies are based upon practices that derive from many 
distinct structures, existing a t  different levels, operating in different modalities, and based on 
widely varying types and quantities of resources. While it is common for a certain range of these 
structures to be homologous, like those described by Bourdieu in Outline of a Theorv of P r a c h  it 
is never true that all of them are homologous. Structures tend to vary significantly between 
different institutional spheres, so that kinship structures will have different logics and dynamics 
than religious structures, productive structures, aesthetic structures, educational structures, and 
so on. There is, moreover, important variation even within a given sphere. For example, the 
structures that shape and constrain religion in Christian societies include authoritarian, prophetic, 
ritual, and theological modes. These may sometimes operate in harmony, but they can also lead 
to sharply conflicting claims and empowerments. The multiplicity of structures means that the 
knowledgeable social actors whose practices constitute a society are far more versatile than 
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Bourdieu's account of a universally homologous habitus would imply: they are capable of applying 
a wide range of different and even incompatible rules and have access to heterogeneous arrays of 
resources. 
The transDosabihty of rules, 
. . 
Moreover, the rules to which actors have access can be 
applied across a wide range of circumstances. This is actually recognized by Bourdieu, but he has 
not, in my opinion, drawn the correct conclusions from his insight. Rules were defined earlier in 
this paper a s  generalizeable or transposable procedures applied in the enactment of social life. 
The term "generalizeable" is taken from Giddens; the term "transposable," which I prefer, is 
taken from ~ o u r d i e u . ~  At one point Bourdieu defines the habitus a s  
a system of lasting transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions 
ix of perceptions. aD~reciabns.  a . . at every moment a s  a &r nd action! and makes possible 
the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes 
permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems (p. 83, emphasis Bourdieu's). 
The slippage in this passage occurs in the final phrase: "permitting the solution of 
similarly shaped problems." Whether a given problem is similarly shaped enough to be solved by 
anological transfers of schemes cannot be decided in advance by social-scientific analyists, but 
must be determined case by case by the actors, which means that there is no fixed limit to the 
possible transpositions. (This is in fact implied by the earlier phrase "makes possible the 
achievement of infinitely diversified tasks".) To say that rules are transposable, in other words, is 
to say that they can be applied to an inherently unpredictable range of cases outside the context in 
which they are initially learned. After all, in ordinary speech one cannot be said to really know a 
rule simply because one can apply it mechanically to repeated instances of the same case. 
Whether we are speaking of rules of grammar, mathematics, law, ettiquette, or carpentry, the 
real test of knowing a rule is to be able to apply it successfully in unfamiliar cases. Knowledge of 
a rule by definition means the ability to transpose or extend it -- that is, to apply it creatively. If 
this is so, then -, which I would define precisely as  the capacity to transpose and extend 
rules to new contexts, is inherent in the knowledge of rules that characterizes all minimally 
competent members of society. 6 
T-ilitv of resource EUMU&QL 
. . 1 ' But the very fact that rules are by 
definition capable of being transposed or extended means that the resource consequences of the 
enactment of rules is always unpredictable. A joke-told to a new audience, an  investment made in 
a new market, an offer of marriage made to a new patriline, a cavalry attack made on a new 
terrain, a crop planted in a newly cleared field or in a familiar field in a new spring: the effect of 
these actions on the resources of the actors is never quite certain. Investment in a new market 
may make .the entrepreneur a pauper or a millionaire; negotiation of a marriage with a new 
patriline may result in a family's elevation in status or its extinction in a'feud; planting a crop in 
the familiar field may result in subsistence, starvation, or plenty. Moreover, if the enactment of 
rules creates unpredictable quantities and qualities of resources, and the reproduction of rules 
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depends on their continuing validation by resources, this implies that rules will in fact be 
differentially validated when they are put into action and therefore will potentially be subject to 
modification. A brilliantly successful cavalry attack on a new terrain may change the battle plans 
of subsequent campaigns or even theories of military tactics; a joke that draws rotten tomatoes 
rather than laughter may result in its suppression .from the commedian's repertoire; a succession 
of crop failures may modify routines of planting or plowing. 
The polvsemv of r e s o u r c a  The term polysemy (or multiplicity of meaning) is normally 
applied to symbols, language, or texts. Its application to resources sounds like a contradiction in 
terms. But given the concept of resources I have been advocating in this paper it is not. 
Resources, I have insisted, embody rules. L i e  texts or ritual performances, however, their 
meaning is never entirely unambiguous. The form of the factory embodies and therefore teaches 
capitalist notions of property relations. But a s  Marx points out, it can also teach the necessarily 
social and collective character of production, and thereby undermine the capitalist notion of private 
property. The new prestige, wealth, and territory gained from the brilliant success of a cavalry 
charge may be attributed to the superior discipline and ]Ian of the cavalry officers and thereby 
2 2 
enhance the power of an aristocratic officer corps or it may be attributed the commanding general 
and thereby result in the increasing subordination of officers to a charismatic leader. Any array 
of resources is capable of being interpreted in varying ways, and therefore of empowering different 
actors and teaching different rules. Again, this seems to me inherent in a definition of agency as  
the capacity to transpose and extend rules to new contexts. Agency, to put it differently, is the 
actor's capacity to reinterpret and mobilize an array of resources in terms of rules other than 
those that initially constituted the array. 
The intersection of str- One reason arrays of resources can be interpreted in more 
than one way is that structures or structural complexes intersect and overlap. The structures of 
capitalist society include both a mode of production based on private property and profit and a 
mode of labor organization based on workplace solidarity. The factory figures a s  a crucial 
resource in both of these structures, and its meaning and consequences for both workers and 
managers is therefore open and contested. The intersection of structures in fact takes place a t  
both the rule and the resource levels. Not only can a given array of resources be claimed by 
different actors embedded in different structural complexes (or differentially claimed by the same 
actor embedded in different structural complexes), but rules can be borrowed or appropriated from 
one structural complex and applied to another. Not only do workers and factory owners struggle 
for control of the factory, but Marx appropriates political economy for the advancement of 
socialism. 
Structures, then, are sets of mutually sustaining rules and resources that empower and 
constrain social action and that tend to be reproduced by that social action. But their reproduction 
is never automatic. Structures are a t  risk, a t  least to some extent, in all of the social encounters 
they shape -- because structures are multiple and intersecting, because rules are transposable, and 
because resources are polysemic and accumulate unpredictably. Placing the dynamic relationship 
between resources and rules a t  the center of a concept of structure makes it possible show how 
social change, no less than social stasis, can be generated by the enactment of structural rules in 
social life. 
PUTTING THE THEORY TO WORK 
Although the argument of this article has been relentlessly abstract, I have in fact been 
guided by the principle of practical analytical utility. It is impossible in the space available to give 
extended examples of how the theory might inform social scientific practice. But I would like $to 
illustrate its utility briefly by two means: first, by attempting to apply it schematically to a well 
known case of social change and, second, by showing how its language and categories can be used 
to clarify the characteristics and dynamics of three important types of structural complexes. 
Duality of Structure and the Protestant Ethic 
Let me begin by showing how Max Weber's argument in The Proh-stant Ethic 
Rise of Capitalism (1958) could be recast in terms of the transformative dynamics of dual 
structures. This by no means etablishes the superior utility of my theory, but it a t  least indicates 
that it has some plausibility as  a means of tallring about social transformations. 
The account would begin with rules initially elaborated in the context of theological dispute 
and religious practice: the Calvinist concepts of calling and predestination. These rules are applied 
in a new context: the commercial operations of urban merchants and petty manufacturers. The 
consistent enactment of theologically generated rules in this context also has definite but 
unexpected resource consequences: by working hard and living ascetically, urban bourgeois 
accumulate capital. This has the "normal" or expected reproductive effects: it validates the moral 
rules of Calvinism and the virtue of those who practice them. But the continuing accumulation of 
capital also has an effect in the distinct structural complex of production and exchange, where 
Calvinist merchants become increasingly powerful in markets. I t  also tends to enhance their 
power in other realms of life, for example in politics. These effects make possible an alternative 
reading of the resources: a valuation of capital accumulation for its own sake or for the social 
power and authority it brings. Hence the spirit of capitalism breaks free of its origins in the 
Protestant ethic. In this case I begin with a transposition or application of a rule, but I could just 
a s  easily have begun with a reading of resources. One could argue that before the coming of 
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Calvinism, merchants already had traits of probity, self-discipline, and piety, had a capacity for 
abstract calculation, and possessed sizeable accumulations of wealth that were not fully validated 
in a Catholic and aristocratic culture. This pattern of resources, the argument would continue, 
meant that the new theology of Calvin could be appropriated to make a particularly cogent reading 
of their social situation, and therefore resulted in a widespread adoption of Calvinism by the urban 
mercantile classes. 
It  should be evident even from this very brief and telescoped example that the concept of 
structure a s  a duality of rules and resources, supplemented by the principles of the multiplicity 
and intersection of structures, the transposability of rules, the unpredictability of resource 
accumulation, and the polysemy of resources, makes possible a neat restatement of a classical 
argument in historical sociology. This implies that it might be a useful for conceptualizing other 
sequences of social transformation as  well. 
Analysing Variations in  Structural Dynamics 
The concept of structure I elaborate in this paper is very general and therefore could be 
applied to structures of widely differing character -- ranging in import from structures that shape 
and constrain the development of world military power to those that shape and constrain the 
joking practices of a group of Sunday fishing buddies or the erotic practices of a single couple. 
This immense range in the scope and character of the structures to which this article's concepts 
can be applied is appropriate, given the premise that all social action is generated by structures. 
But it suggests a need for some means of distinguishing the character and dynamics of different 
sorts of structures. I will not offer a detailed typology of structures -- both because space is short 
and because I feel that any such typologies should arise out of attempts to analyze real cases of 
social change. Instead, I shall simply indicate two important dimensions along which structures 
vary -- depth and power -- and try to demonstrate that thinking in terms of these dimensions can 
help to illuminate the very different dynamics and durabilities of three important types of 
structures: those of language, states, and capitalism. 
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Depth is a key metaphor of linguistic and structuralist discourse. To designate a structure 
as "deep" implies that it lies beneath and generates a certain range of "surface" structures, just 
as structures underlie and generate practices. Deep structures are those rules that can be shown 
to underlie ordinary or "surface" structures, in the sense that the surface structures are a set of 
transformations of the deep structures. Thus the structural rules for the performance of a fertility 
ritual may be shown to be particular transformations of a deeper set of oppositions between wet 
and dry or male and female that also underlie the structures governing other institutionally 
distinct practices, from housebuilding, to personal adornement, to oratory. Consequently, deep 
structural rules are also pervasive, in the sense that they are present in a relatively wide range of 
institutional spheres, practices, and discourses. They also tend u, be relatively unconscious, in the 
sense that they are taken-for-granted mental assumptions or modes of procedure that actors 
normally apply without being aware that they are applying them. 
Different structures also vary enormously in the resources, and hence the power, that 
they mobilize. Military structures or of structures shaping state finance create massive 
concentrations of power, whereas the grammatical structures of a language or the structures 
shaping schoolchildrens' play create much more modest power concentrations. Structures also 
differ in the kinds of power they mobilize. For example, the power created by apostolic succession 
is based primarily (although by no means exclusively) on persuasion, while that created by the 
military government of a conquering army is based primarily on coercion. 
m. I believe that thinking about structures in terms of their depth and power can 
lead to significant insights about the structures' durability and dynamics. Consider, for example, 
linguistic structures, which have tended to be used by scholars in many disciplines a s  the prime 
example of structure in general. Linguistic structures, which of course tend to be remarkably 
durable, actually fall a t  the extremes on the dimensions of both power and depth. Linguistic 
structures are extraordinarily deep. The syntactical and sematic structures of language underlie 
all the multitude of structures that rely a t  least in part on speech and writing -- which is to say 
the immense preponderance of all structures. Moreover, there may be depths beneath the depths 
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of linguistic structure: Chomsky (1972) has posited a universal generative grammar that underlies 
all human languages. The power of linguistic structures, on the other hand, is unusually slight. 
The enactment of syntactical and semantic structures in speech or writing in itself has only the 
most modest resource effects. It confirms the speaker's membership in a linguistic community 
and reinforces the rules that make the generation of grammatical sentences possible. Assuming 
that an utterance is made to other competent speakers of the language, the speaking of a 
grammatical sentence in itself creates no significant power disparities, but rather establishes an 
equality among the conversants. Language of course serves a s  a medium for all kinds of 
enactments of power relations. But a t  the level of syntax and semantics, it is as  close a s  we are 
likely to get to a neutral medium of exchange. 
Indeed, I would argue that this very neutrality with respect to power helps to account for 
the other peculiarity of linguistic structures: their extraordinary durability. If the enactment of 
linguistic rules serves only to sustain the linguistic empowerment of speakers without shifting 
resources toward some speakers and away from others, then no one has much incentive to engage 
in linguistic innovation. I also believe that thinking about the power dimension of language can 
help explain why change in semantics, although glacial by comparison with changes in most 
structures, is far more rapid than changes in syntax. While it is virtually unheard of for social 
conflicts or social projects to center on rules of grammar, it is obviously far more common for the 
meaning of words -- "nation," "work," "Mrs.," "science," "subsistance," or "liberate," to mention a 
few obvious cases -- to be a t  issue in social action. The recent expansion of the meaning of 
"gender" from its specialized grammatical usage to its usage as  a general marker of sexual 
difference has been the result of feminists' concerted efforts to enhance the power of women in 
political and intellectual life. It is such social actions -- with their mobilizations of and effects on 
power -- that make semantic changes occur more rapidly than syntactical changes. 
Overall, it is clear that linguistic structures have much less power and are much deeper 
and more durable than most structures. For this reason, we should be wary of the widespread 
tendency to use linguistic structures a s  a model or paradigm for structures in general. The 
elegance of the linguistic model sets an  enviable standard, but structures that operate nearer the 
surface of social life and that are more thoroughly implicated in its power relations may be very 
different from linguistic structures in their principles and dynamics. One of the dangers that 
arises from uncritically accepting the linguistic model is a tendency to think of structures as  
composed purely of rules, ignoring the resource dimension altogether. This tendency is perhaps 
clearest among the Levi-Straussian structuralists, but it touches Giddens as well, especially when 
he claims that structures have only a virtual existence. In studying the syntactic structures of 
languages, where the enactment of rules has virtually negligible power consequences, it probably 
doesn't matter much if the resource aspect of structure is neglected. But when we try to make 
sense of the multiple arenas of social life that are permeated with power relations, it may be 
downright crippling to apply the linguistic analogy and conceptualize structures purely as  rules. 
States. Particularly poor candidates for the linguistic analogy would be state or political 
structures, which commonly generate and utilize large concentrations of power, and which are 
usually relatively near the surface of social life -- that is, are consciously established, maintained, 
fought over, and argued about rather than taken-for-granted as  if they were unchangeable 
features of the world. Although one might initially imagine that large power concentrations would 
tend to assure a structure's durability, this may not actually be true. Although centralized states 
with massive coercive power impose high costs on those who would challenge them, it is far from 
clear that centralized and coercive states have generally proved more durable than relatively 
decentralized and uncoercive states. Compare, for example, France to Britain between 1750 and 
1850, the united States to Germany from 1870 to 1950, Costa Rica to Nicaragua, El Salvador, or 
Guatamala since World War 11, or India to China over the same time span. And even the 
relatively stable states are subject to periodic structural transformations. Although the the United 
States has had a single constitution since 1789, it has experienced a succession of fundamental 
political crises that produced a t  least five sharply distinct party systems over the past two 
centuries (Burnham, 1967). One might argue that state structures are relatively mutable 
2 8 
precisely because the massiveness (power) and obviousness (lack of depth) of their resource effects 
make them natural targets for open struggles. 
But if most political structures are characterized by both high power and low depth, an 
inverse relationship between power and depth is by no means necessary. There are some political 
structures with immense power implications that are nevertheless relatively deep, that have 
become "second nature" and are accepted by all (or nearly all) parties a s  essentially power- 
neutral, taken-for-granted means to political ends. Such structures also appear to be unusually 
durable. This would appear to be true of political structures as  diverse as  the American 
constitutional system, the French public bureaucracy, or the English community legal structures 
whose remarkable persistence Margaret Somers has traced from the fourteenth to the mid- 
nineteenth century (Somers, 1986). Durability, then, would appear to be determined more by a 
structure's depth than by its power. 
Ca~italism. How do structures with massive power effects become or remain deep, since 
one would normally expect the massiveness of the effects to make social actors aware of and 
willing to contest the structures' rules and resource accumulations? 1 will approach this question 
by examining the case of capitalism, perhaps the most spectacular case of a power-laden yet long- 
enduring structure. Capitalism is, of course, a highly dynamic, ever-changing system. Yet it is 
commonly maintained that the past two hundred fifty to three hundred years -- if not the entire 
period from the sixteenth century to the present (according to Wallerstein, 1974) -- constitutes a 
unified capitalist era with a continuous dynamic of capital accumulation guided by an essentially 
unchanged core structure, what in Marxian parlance is called the capitalist mode of production. 
Marx himself noted the extraordinarily dynamic and changeable character of capitalist 
development, but he saw the change converging on a single form: the large-scale, mechanized 
factory staffed by an increasingly homogeneous proletariat. Recent developments have tended to 
make the changability of capitalism seem more radical and permanent. Far from registering the 
onrush of the classic factory, the current era of world economic growth has been characterized by 
increasing use of subcontracting, sweat-shops, out-sourcing, and "cottage industry" and by the 
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bourgeoning of services a t  the expense of manufacturing. At the same time, scholars are 
increasingly pointing out the unevenness, contingency, and openness of development patterns 
under capitalism, whether in the past (Samuel, 1977; Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985; Sewell, 1988) or in 
the present and future (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Sabel has even suggested that forms of economic 
change in the so-called capitalist era are so indeterminate that the very concept of capitalism, with 
its implication of underlying regularity, is misleading and should be abandoned (1988). I think 
Sabel is right a s  far a s  he goes: that a wide variety of institutional arrangements and property 
relations are compatible with "capitalism" and that never in its history has capitalism obeyed 
uniform "laws of motion." Capitalist development has always been a messy and uneven affair. 
But I think that the messiness has been at the level of secondary or surface structures and that 
beneath the surface flux iies a far more stable deep structure of rules that are continually 
reinforced by flows of resources -- even on occasions when the surface structures are 
revolutionized. 
Unlike most Marxians, I see the core rules not a s  those defining the wage-labor 
7 relationship but as  those governing the conversion of use value into exchange value. The core 
procedure of capitalism -- the conversion of use value into exchange value or the commodification 
of things -- is exceptionally generalizeable or transposable. I t  knows no natural limits; it can be 
applied not only to cloth, tobacco, or cooking pans, but to land, housework, bread, sex, advertizing, 
or knowledge, each of which can be converted into any other by means of money. The surface 
instability of capitalism arises precisely from this interconvertability, which encourages holders of 
resources to trade them for different kinds of resources as  relative values change, and which 
always makes it possible for resources not previously treated as commodities to be commodified -- 
that is, to enter the circuit of monetized exchanges. To put it otherwise, the commodity form, by 
making almost all resources readable as exchangeable commodities, organizes a virtually 
universal intersection of structures, which means that changes in any one structure -- an 
increased or decreased accumulation of resources or a new procedure -- can affect an indefinitely 
vast number other structures that intersect through the medium of money. Changes a t  any point 
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in the circuit of exchange will give rise to resource effects and innovations elsewhere. And these 
changes are not necessarily constrained to follow any particular institutional form, so long as  they 
are profitable: thus the rise of the automobile industry stimulated the simultaneous development 
of rubber plantations based on indentured or forced labor, steel mills based on immense factories 
manned by wage-earning proletarians, and a proliferation of repair shops run by self-employed 
petty capitalists. 
But this chronic instability or unpredictability of capitalism's surface structures actually 
reinforces its deeper structures. An alteration anywhere along the vast chain of commodity 
exchanges is a new incitement to invest; the logic inherent in the commodity form makes any new 
array of resources or new procedure a potential opportunity for profit. And of course any new 
investment results in further changes. Even investments that fail create new opportunities that 
can be siezed by following the normal procedures of capitalist investment and exchange -- when a 
.- 
firm goes under there is plant and equipment to be bought up a t  bargain prices, a residual market 
for the firm's ex-competitors to exploit, and so on. Consequently, the procedures themselves are 
remarkably impervious to -- indeed paradoxically are reinforced by -- the failures of particular 
capitalist enterprises or industries. Persons, firms, regions, and nations rise and fall, but 
capitalism spins on. The displacement of hand-weavers by the power loom or of coal by petroleum 
may have destroyed skills, wrecked businesses, or blighted the economies of certain localities. But 
it simultaneously proved that following the logic of the commodity form creates wealth for those 
who do so, and even -- over the long run and in spite of important local exceptions -- for the , 
capitalist economy as  a whole. Unpredictable resource accumulations continually and routinely 
undermine local or surface structures of capitalism, but because of the virtually unlimited 
interconvertability of resources under the commodity form, the same unpredictability actually 
validates its deep structures. Hence, under certain particular circumstances, structures can 
combine depth with great power, and consequently can shape the experiences of entire societies 
over many generations. 
CONCLUSION 
Besides its practical utility in explicating the reproduction and transformation of 
structures, I believe that the theory of structure outlined in this article has certain theoretical 
advantages. The vocabulary and conceptual framework I have developed in this article can help 
us to clarify three long-standing and elusive problems in social theory. It enables us to explain 
both social stability and social change within a unified framework and vocabulary; it furnishes a 
clear and workable concept of agency; and it can help us to overcome the venerable but sterile 
dichotomy between the ideal and the material. 
(1) W ~ l i t v  and Chwge 
. . . One abiding problem of theories of social change is that change 
and stability have typically been cast as  opposing categories and explained -by different theoretical 
principles. Stability, for example, is typically regarded as a consequence of structure or value 
consensus and is analyzed synchronically, while change is conceptualized a s  a consequence of 
contradictions, breakdown, or exogenous influences and is analyzed diachronically. The theory of 
structure elaborated in this article encompasses both stability and change in a unified conceptual 
universe, enabling us to explain both with the same vocabulary. Stability, reconceptualized as 
reproduction, is as much a temporal process as transformation, and both transformation and 
reproduction are consequences of the dialectical production of resources through rule enactment 
and of rules through resource accumulation. Both stability and change are Drocessual notions; 
they are not opposing principles, but rather varying relative positions on a single scale. 
(2) &. Thinking about structure as  a duality of rules and resources also makes it 
possible to define more clearly what is usually a rather mysterious term in social theory: agency. 
Rather than entering the theory as  a primordial quality of the will, agency is defined as  the 
relationship of human beings to structures, in both their rule and resourse senses. All members of 
society are agents, according to this theory, because all of them have some knowledge of the rules 
of social life and control over some measure of human and nonhuman resources. Agency, 
therefore, can be defined as the actor's knowledge of rules, which means the capacity to apply 
them to new contexts; alternatively, the same thing can be said the other way around, by defining 
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agency as the actor's control of resources, which means the capacity to reinterpret or mobilize an 
array of resources in terms of rules other than those that constituted the array. In this theory, 
then, agency is not an  occult quality that exists apart from and in opposition to structure, but the 
constitutive stuff of structure. 
(3) Idealisan and Ma- This conceptualization of structure also points toward a 
transcendence of the perpetually vexing question of idealism and materialism. Most contemporary 
social theorists are uncomfortable with the conventional distinction between material and ideal, or 
material and mental, or base and superstructure. One reason for this discomfort is that it is so 
hard to draw the line separating them in practice. Is the material merely the economic? If so, 
does that mean that state oppression or patriarchal oppression is somehow not material, and 
hence by implication not as  fundamental or as  important as  economic oppression? Nearly all 
social theorists nowadays in fact recognize the power of culture or symbols or discourse in the 
shaping and transformation of social life. This is as  true of Marxists as  of non-Marxists: on this 
point the titanic enemies Louis Althusser (1971) and E. P. Thompson (1978) are actually in 
accord. But there remains a certain epistemological angst about how the power of culture is to be 
justified theoretically without embracing some kind of idealism. Perhaps the most common move 
is to expand vastly the notion of the material until it has absorbed those phenomena normally 
regarded a s  ideas. Thus Althusser insists that ideology "has a material existence" because it is 
derived from the material practices (rituals, gestures, actions) of an ideological apparatus (1971, 
pp. 165-70) or Giddens talks about "organic memory traces," rather than "ideas" (1984, 377). 
The definition of structures elaborated in this article implies that the distinction between 
opposed ideal and material categories is actually quite misplaced and should be replaced by two 
apparently analogous but in fact significantly different distinctions. The first is a distinction 
between human and non-human resources. Here "human" would appear to be analogous to 
"ideal'' and "non-human" to "material," and Giddens, as  we have seen, makes this fateful elision. 
Yet the "human" category includes both the material bodies and the minds of human beings. 
What makes it useful to distinguish human bodies from other material objects is precisely that 
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they are inseperable from human minds. This means that they have utterly different dynamics 
I as resources than other material objects; that their material powers and resistences are 
inextrciably intertwined with "ideal" factors -- their thoughts, knowledge, desires, fears, 
intentions, memories, and so on. Accepting the distinction between human and non-human 
resources implies that it is incorrect to think of some aspects of human behavior (production and 
perhaps military action) a s  "material" and others (writing, oratory, science, or politics) as  "ideal." 
Production, no less than science, involves knowledge, intentions, and puzzles; oratory, no less than 
military action, burns calories and requires the development of bodily gestures and muscular 
prowess. All human action, in whatever sphere, is an  inseperable mix of the "ideal" and the 
"material." Indeed, the "ideal" and "material" labels should probably be dropped entirely in favor 
of the term "human," so long as  we remain keenly aware that every human activity involves Bnth 
ideation and physical activity. 
The other distinction retained by this theory is between virtual and actual structures. 
Again there is a certain analogy between this distinction and the commonplace distinction between 
the ideal and the material. All resources are material, in that they occupy specifiable locations in 
space and time. And because rules are virtual they are transposable from one time-space location 
to another. This transposibility of rules might be said in a n  idealist vocabulary to define the 
spirituality of structure -- its "freedom" from the constraints of time and space. But notice that 
the distinction between virtual and actual aspects of structure is a *. not a . 
Whereas the ideal and the material are posited as  metaphysically distict modes of being, the 
virtual and the actual are posited only as  analytically distinguishable asDects of structures whose 
being is always an  inextricable combination of both rules and resources. A duality of the virtual 
and actual leads us to explicate the mutual determination of rules by resources through the 
medium of human agency; a dualism of the idea1 and material would lead us into sterile 
arguments about how either the ideal determines the material or the material the ideal -- in either 
case banishing human agency from social life. By adopting instead the notion of the duality of 
structure, we can restore humans to the central place they actually occupy in history. 
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1. Although I am far less knowledgeable about the discourse of the natural sciences than of the 
social sciences, "structure" seems to play an essentially identical role there. The origin of such 
usages was, as  far a s  I am aware, in seventeenth and eighteenth century Botany, whence it 
spread to other natural and social sciences. See Foucault (1973, pp. 132-8). 
2. If I understand Giddens properly, it is a s  true of memory traces a s  it is of practices that they 
are not structures but "instantiations of structures". In other words, structures may be mental, 
but they do not exist whole in the mind of any actor. Rather, the knowledge lodged in any single 
brain is a particular instantiation of structures that are transpersonal, just as the rules of 
grammar of the English language are not the same a s  the rules known by any particular English 
speaker. 
3. I t  is not possible here to list a representative example of the anthropological works that 
elaborate various "rules of social life." The most influential formulation of the anthropological 
concept of culture is probably Geertz (1973). For a superb review of recent developments in 
cultural anthropology, see Ortner (1984). 
4. A distinction between material and non-material resources, if taken seriously, would require an 
-endless and totally unrealistic conceptual hairsplitting that would divide minds from bodies. It 
would, for example, force us to classify soldiersy bodies with guns and grenades, but would 
separate them fromthe knowledge and emotional commitments that make soldiers' bodies useable 
in warfare. 
5. To generalize a rule implies stating it in more abstract form so that it will apply to a larger 
number of cases. The verb "transpose" implies a concrete application of a rule to a new case, but 
in such a way that the rule will have subtly different forms in each of its applications. This is 
implied by three of the'oxford English Dictionary's definitions: "To remove from one place or time 
to another; to transfer, shift," "to alter the order of or the position of in a series ...to interchange," 
and, in music, "to put into a different key." "Tran-," in French (which was.of course the 
language in which Bourdieu wrote), also has an even more appropriate meaning: "faire changer de 
forme ou de contenu en faisant passer dans un autre domaine," (to cause something to change in 
form or content by causing it to pass into another domain" J-e Petit Robest, p 2007). I would like 
my use of "transpose" to be understood as retaining something of this French meaning. 
6. Here my thinking has been significantly influenced by Goran Therborn's The Ideolom of Power 
and the Power of Ideology (1980, esp. pp. 15-22). Therborn, who begins from the problematic 
established by Althusser in his essay on "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" (1971) 
insists that the operation of ideology in contemporary society results not only in the the creation of 
subjects willing and able to do their part in the reproduction of capitalism. Individuals are 
subjected by ideology, but also "qualified" by it. "The formation of humans by every ideology, 
conservative or revolutionary, oppressive or emancipatory, according to whatever -criteria, involves 
a process simultaneously of subjection and qualification. The amorphous libido and manifold 
potentialities of human infants are subjected to a particular order that allows or favors certain 
drives and capacities, and prohibits or disfavours others. At the same time, through the same 
process, new members become qualified to take up and perform (a particular part of) the 
repertoire of roles given in the society into which they are born, including the role of possible 
.agents of social change." (17) 
7. John Roemer has proved to my satisfaction that capitalist exploitation can occur even in the 
absence of wage labor (bemer,  1982). 
